Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 40 | Number 2

Article 7

March 2016

Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority under
New York State’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law
Thomas Hooker
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Law Commons,
and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas Hooker, Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority under New York State’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J.
869 (2012).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol40/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

HOOKER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2013 7:26 PM

ZONING OUT FRACKING: ZONING
AUTHORITY UNDER NEW YORK STATE’S
OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING LAW
Thomas Hooker*
Introduction ............................................................................................. 869
I. Fracking and Its Current Legal Landscape ................................... 874
A. What Is Fracking, and Who Regulates the Process? ........ 874
B. Federal Law & Interstate Law............................................. 875
C. New York State Law............................................................. 878
1. Fracking on Hold ............................................................. 878
2. Environmental Conservation Law ................................ 879
3. Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law ................................ 880
4. Preemption ....................................................................... 882
5. New York State Constitution and Home Rule Law ... 893
6. Mined Land Reclamation Law ...................................... 898
II. Local or State Rule over Local Governance................................ 901
A. Preemption of Fracking Under the Oil, Gas, and
Solution Mining Law ............................................................ 902
B. Constitutional Analysis ........................................................ 906
III. Increasing Public Welfare One Zoning Ordinance at a
Time ............................................................................................... 908
A. Preemption Analysis Should Not Apply ............................ 908
B. Applying the Constitution.................................................... 909
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 913

INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, an increasing amount of public concern
has focused on the ills of a method of natural gas drilling called
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hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.”1 Fracking has been linked to
contamination of drinking water, earthquakes, rapid deterioration of
public roads, and air pollution.2 The safety of drinking water has
been a particularly prevalent topic.
Although only two
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) studies have linked
fracking to the contamination of water wells,3 there have been several
incidents in which safety precautions have failed to prevent the
escape of natural gas into the water aquifer,4 and several studies have
shown a correlation between drilling activity and high methane levels
in nearby water wells.5
On the other hand, states are always in need of jobs, and natural
gas jobs are particularly attractive in a worsening economy.6 Studies
have shown that natural gas has not only been a boon to employment
in the core drilling industry, but also to employment in ancillary

1. See, e.g., Darryl Fears, Sitting Atop Huge Gas Reserve, Md. Debates
Fracking, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2011, at A5; Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, and
Concern There May Be More, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2011, at A13. These ills are
showcased in the movie Gasland, where a farmer in Dimock, PA with a fracking well
on his land is able to light his water on fire due to the high percentage of methane
that has seeped into his water well. GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010).
2. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHALE GAS
PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 90-DAY REPORT—AUG. 18, 2011, at 3, 41 n.25 (2011);
see also AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION OF
POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA FIELD,
GARVIN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 1 (2011), available at http://thinkprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/Fracking-quake.pdf.
3. Dominic C. DiGiulio et al., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVESTIGATION OF
GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING, at xi (2011),
available at http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOn
Pavillion_Dec-8-2011.pdf; 1 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS,
AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987). Negotiated settlements regarding potential
drinking water contamination usually contain a confidentiality clause barring
landowners from publicly producing evidence of contamination, thus significantly
limiting the data available. Urbina, supra note 1, at A13.
4. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Dark Side of a Natural Gas Boom,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at B1. In some cases, fracking fluid has advanced through
fissures created by the fracking process into old water wells, and subsequently into
underground water resources, thus polluting local drinking water. Id.
5. Stephen G. Osborne et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water
Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. OCTOBER 2011 EDITION 8172, 8172–73 (2011).
6. CTR. FOR WORKFORCE INFO. & ANALYSIS, PA. DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS.,
MARCELLUS SHALE FAST FACTS 15 (2011).
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industries.7 At a time when the financial crisis has run a number of
states’ budgets to a financial precipice,8 the natural gas industry
provides a stable source of tax revenue.9 Moreover, a large state
supply of natural gas would decrease dependence on other energy
sources, namely coal and nuclear power, which operate within
unstable regulatory environments.10
Currently, New York faces both a host of financial issues and its
own energy crunch. The upcoming closing of the Indian Point
nuclear power plant, which supplies up to 25% of New York City and
Westchester County’s energy capacity, and the simultaneous impact
of proposed state and environmental regulations may cause a 50%
reduction in New York State’s generating capacity by 2016.11 As a
result, state officials are pushing the State to look for more stable
sources of energy.12
Due to stricter federal regulation of dirty fossil fuels, such as coal
and oil,13 and advancements in drilling technology, natural gas, which

7. From 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q1, the Pennsylvania employment rate has increased
by 114% in core natural gas industries, adding 10,900 jobs, and has decreased by less
than 1% in ancillary industries, losing 1,000 jobs. Id. at 4. Over the same period,
Pennsylvania’s unemployment rate has increased by 3%, losing 160,000 jobs. Id.
8. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, The Little State With a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2011, at B1.
9. TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY: AN UPDATE 12 (2010),
available
at
http://www.energyindepth.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/PSUMarcellus-Updated-Economic-Impact.pdf. Researchers at PSU estimated that the
natural gas industry generated more than 29,000 jobs and $240 million in
Pennsylvania state and local taxes in 2008. Id. at 19. Additionally, landowner
royalties on a typical horizontal well (priced at $6 per 1,000 cubic feet of gas with a
12.5% royalty payment) will accrue to $750,000 to $1 million over a five-year period.
N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON STATE ASSET MAXIMIZATION, FINAL REPORT 62 (2009).
10. Joseph De Avila, Property: Area Power Needs Debated, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
2011, at A22.
11. N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, POWER TRENDS 2011: ENERGIZING NEW YORK’S
LEGACY OF LEADERSHIP 39–41 (2011).
12. Id. at 44. The upcoming regulations require the improving of power plants to
achieve: “reasonably available control technology for oxides of nitrogen,” “best
available retrofit technology,” “maximum achievable control technology,” and “best
technology available for cooling water intake structures.” Id. at 40. On the other
hand, some researchers have also found the energy threat to New York may be
overstated based on assumptions that New York must maintain its current capacity
surplus. See TIM WOOLF ET AL., SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS, INC., INDIAN POINT
ENERGY CENTER NUCLEAR RETIREMENT ANALYSIS 32 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Editorial, The EPA’s War on Jobs, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2011, at
A14; Shawn McCarthy, Pricey U.S. Carbon Rules Pose Hurdles for Oil Sands,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 7, 2010, at B1.
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is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, has become a much more attractive
resource.14 The skyrocketing demand for locally extracted and
developed natural gas that can be supplied with minimal
transportation costs is clearly an incentive behind New York’s
Department of Environmental Conservation’s (DEC’s) push to
permit instate well drilling and development.
On a national scale, consumption is rapidly increasing.15 The
current oversupply of natural gas on the market has pushed natural
gas prices down.16 In anticipation of the expected shift by U.S.
utilities from coal to natural gas,17 however, producers are still
desperately seeking to open up more untapped domestic natural gas
resources.18 An increasing percentage of domestic natural gas
resources are coming from shale gas.19
New York sits atop one of the largest shale formations in the
country, the Marcellus Shale. Shale gas found in a shale formation is
thermogenic gas.20 Thermogenic gas, the type of natural gas found in
the Marcellus Shale, is formed over millions of years by the
application of heat and pressure to buried organic matter.21 Wells
drilled into the gas reservoir allow the highly compressed gas to

14. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 3–4
(2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/
epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf.
15. Natural gas consumption in the United States rose from 21.7 trillion cubic feet
in 2006 to 24.1 trillion cubic feet in 2010. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, Natural Gas Consumption in the United States, 2006-2011, NAT. GAS
MONTHLY, Apr. 2011, at 5 tbl.2, available at http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/
monthly/archive/2011/2011_04/pdf/ngm_all.pdf.
16. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SHORT TERM ENERGY
OUTLOOK, Sept. 2012, at 6, available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/
steo/archives/sep12.pdf.
17. Rebecca Smith, Coal-Fired Plants Mothballed by Gas Glut, WALL ST. J., Sept.
12, 2012, at B1.
18. See, e.g., Natural Gas Weekly Update for Week Ending September 12, 2012,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/
weekly/archive/2012/09_13/index.cfm.
19. MASS. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS:
AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY
MIT
STUDY
27–29
(2012),
available
at
http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/NaturalGas_Report.pdf [hereinafter MIT ENERGY
INITIATIVE] (noting that from 2000 to 2009, the contribution of shale gas to US
annual gross gas production increased from 1% to 14%).
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. Similar to conventional natural gas, thermogenic natural gas is primarily
methane, and may contain small amounts of ethane, propane, butane, carbon
dioxide, nitrogen, or hydrogen sulphide. Id.
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expand through the wells.22 Due to the very low permeability of these
wells, it is generally not cost-effective to drill a vertical well into the
formations.23 Using an advanced technology like fracking makes the
development of unconventional resources cost-effective.24
Recently, the U.S. Geological Survey increased its assessment of
the Marcellus Shale from 2 trillion cubic feet to approximately 84
trillion cubic feet of undiscovered, technically recoverable natural
gas.25 The wellhead value of 50 trillion cubic feet of natural gas may
be $1 trillion; thus, making the natural gas in the Marcellus Shale
worth close to $1 trillion.26
Responding to public concerns, many towns and cities across the
country have taken the initiative to prohibit local gas drilling. In New
York, several towns27 have amended or passed zoning ordinances that
would ban fracking, “high impact heavy industry,”28 or gas drilling
entirely. Gas drilling companies advocated strongly against these
zoning ordinances, and are now filing suit to invalidate them.29 The
DEC has not taken a position against municipalities in court.30 The
Court of Appeals has yet to rule on a municipality’s authority to ban

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 36–37.
USGS Releases New Assessment of Gas Resources in the Marcellus Shale,
Appalachian Basin, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:30 AM),
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2893.
26. See INDEP. OIL & GAS ASS’N OF N.Y., HOMEGROWN ENERGY: THE FACTS
ABOUT NATURAL GAS EXPLORATION OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE 3 (2009).
27. Many towns and cities in New York State are considering adopting zoning
ordinances that effectively ban fracking within any part of the town or city, and
several have already done so. Municipal Anti-Fracking Movements in New York
State, CMTY. ENVTL. LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://celdf.org/img/original/
NY%20map%20key%20for%20non%20rights%20based%20efforts%20101511.gif
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013). Buffalo, Wales, Camillus, Geneva, Cherry Valley,
Middlefield, Oneonta, Otsego, Plainfield, Springfield, Danby, Dryden, Ithaca, and
Syracuse have all already passed zoning ordinances effectively banning fracking. Id.
28. Glynis Hart, Dryden Accepts Measure to Ban Fracking, ITHACA TIMES, June
22, 2011, http://www.ithaca.com/news/east/article_0d24a71c-9cf5-11e0-b712-001cc4c
002e0.html.
29. See Andrew Barber, Fracking Shame, N.Y. POST, Feb. 27, 2011,
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/fracking_shame_9uD035Hsq3dz4tLgiFdPWP.
30. See generally N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation et al., Revised Draft
Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and
available
at
Solution
Mining
Regulatory
Program
(Dec.
2011),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf [hereinafter REVISED DRAFT
SGEIS].
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fracking locally. Two lower courts have only recently taken up
litigation directly addressing the issue.31
This Note argues that New York State law does not preclude local
zoning ordinances from prohibiting local fracking. Part I of this Note
lays out the origin of local zoning authority in the state constitution
and subsequent statutes. Part I also outlines the preemption analysis
that a court dealing with a challenge to a local anti-fracking ordinance
will likely apply. Part II examines the conflict among case precedent
that would uphold local zoning ordinances based on express statutory
language or based on constitutional authority, and case precedent
that would find express preemption. Part III concludes that a
constitution-based approach to local authority that adheres to the
plain meaning of the constitution most adequately protects local
interests of those affected, and best preserves predictability in judicial
statutory construction.
I. FRACKING AND ITS CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. What Is Fracking, and Who Regulates the Process?
Fracking is a process of stimulating a natural gas well to maximize
the amount of recoverable natural gas from the well.32 To frack shale
rock, drillers first drill a vertical well that reaches beyond the
underground water resources33 to the shale formation.34 A pipe
extends through the well,35 and is encased in cement pursuant to
agency regulations.36 Once the pipe reaches the shale formation, a
lateral wellbore will drill 2,000 to 6,000 feet into the shale formation.37
To facilitate the escape of the highly compressed natural gas into the
wellhead, the well operator emits fracking fluid through the piping
31. See Complaint at 1–7, Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield,
943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No. 2011-0930); Complaint at 1–12, Anschutz
Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (No.
2011-0902).
32. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowha
t.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
33. The Marcellus Shale extends from an area 4,000 feet below ground-level to
8,500 feet below ground level; treatable underground water resources are at
approximately 850 feet below ground-level. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 19,
at 40.
34. See id. at 38.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 40.
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and into the formation causing the fracturing of shale rock.38
Fracking fluid is principally water, but also contains sand to crack the
shale rock, and a number of unknown chemicals.39 The potential for
these unknown chemicals to reach water wells through fissures
formed during the fracking process,40 and the issue of what to do with
the millions of gallons of water mixed with possibly toxic chemicals
that will return through the wellhead, are significant environmental
concerns.41
Fracking exists within a complex web of overlapping regulatory
bodies.42 Due to its heavy use and discharge of water, it falls under
the jurisdiction of federal, state, and interstate governing bodies.43
Due to the high volume of gas extracted in the process, it falls under
state regulation, and due to the fact that drilling involves
development of local property, it may fall under local government
authority as well.44
B.

Federal Law & Interstate Law

The federal government, through the EPA, sets standards for what
can be injected underground, and how to dispose of the wastewater

38. See id. at 40.
39. See id.
40. See Mouawad & Krauss, supra note 4.
41. See Documents: Natural Gas’s Toxic Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/07/us/natural-gas-documents1.html#document/p1 (noting studies are inconclusive as to the capability of water
treatment plants and waterways to remove pollutants of concern such as
radionuclides). The Niagara Falls government claims its water treatment plant can
adequately treat the fracking wastewater. Carolyn Thompson, Niagara Falls
Envisions Profit in ‘Fracking’ Waste, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/APe76d13d8158a4d25978ec3a8e246ef2a.html.
Once
through the plant, the wastewater would be released into the Niagara River or reused
in fracking. Id. The EPA has announced plans to issue standards regulating the
cleanliness of the water discharged. Id.
42. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1962b (2006) (establishing the
Delaware River Basin Commission to regulate the water withdrawals needed for gas
drilling from the basin); 43 C.F.R. § 3162 (2012) (regulating drilling operations on
federal and Indian lands).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 806.5 (2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 23-0303 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-3301 (McKinney 2012)
(requiring persons conducting any operations with the capacity to withdraw more
than 100,000 gallons of groundwater or surface water per day to file with the
Department of Environmental Conservation).
44. N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 2(b); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney
2012); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303 (McKinney 2012).
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that returns to the surface.45 Under the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), states are authorized to administer underground injection
programs requiring prospective drillers to seek permits disclosing the
chemicals they plan to inject underground.46 A 2005 amendment to
the SDWA prohibits the EPA administrator from prescribing
requirements that interfere with any underground injection for the
recovery of natural gas unless essential to ensuring the safety of
underground sources of drinking water.47 The term “underground
injection” excludes the “injection of fluids or propping agents (other
than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related
to . . . gas . . . production activities.”48 Therefore, unless gas drillers
that plan to use fracking technology inject diesel fuel underground,
they are not required to seek a permit, or to disclose any of the
chemicals in their fracking fluid under federal law.49 Even a
restriction on diesel fuel has proven overly burdensome for gas
drillers who have yet to file for a diesel fuel permit under SDWA,
though multiple tests of fracking wastewater have found diesel fuel is
being used in fracking fluid.50
Acting in tandem with SDWA, the Clean Water Act endows the
EPA with authority to set standards for the discharge of effluent that
comes back up through the well.51 Under the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), the EPA prohibits the
direct discharge of fracking wastewater into waters of the United
45. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1) (2006).
46. Id. § 300h.
47. Id. § 300h(b)(2)(B).
48. Id. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii). This exemption was passed following a 2004 EPA
report concluding that “the injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into [coal bed
methane] wells poses little or no threat to [underground sources of drinking water].”
OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, at ES-9 (2004).
Diesel fuel in fracking fluid was found to present “the greatest threat” to
underground sources of drinking water. Id. at 4–11.
49. A driller using diesel fuel in fracking fluid must seek EPA authorization. 40
C.F.R. §§ 144–48 (2012). However, a Congressional investigation found oil and gas
service companies had injected over thirty-two million gallons of diesel fuel or
fracking fluid containing diesel fuel into wells in nineteen states from 2005 to 2009
without permits. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et al. to Lisa Jackson,
Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=news/waxman-markeyand-degette-investigation-finds-continued-use-of-diesel-in-hydraulic-fracturingf#_ftn6.
50. See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman et al., supra note 49.
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006).
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States52 and sets minimum standards for the quality of pre-treatment
wastewater.53 The DEC administers NPDES on a statewide level.54
Fracking wastewater still ends up in New York’s rivers and lakes.55
The majority of water treatment centers, though happy to take the
wastewater and the payments that come along with it, are not
properly equipped to fully treat wastewater that has been
contaminated with a host of unknown chemicals.56
Fracking requires tons of water and naturally results in tons of
wastewater rising back to the surface.57 A large portion of that water
will likely come from the Delaware River Basin, which extends into
southeastern New York, and the Susquehanna River Basin, which
extends into south central New York. The Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC) and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission
(SRBC) regulate the rate and volume of water withdrawals from their
respective basins.58 Their regulatory authority overlaps with federal,

52. 40 C.F.R. §§ 435.12–30 (requiring the use of the best available technology to
limit effluent discharge).
53. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Notice of Final 2010 Effluent Guidelines Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 66,286 (Oct. 26, 2011). Although the EPA presently allows state agencies
to set pretreatment fracking wastewater standards, the EPA has published a notice of
intent to set national standards in this area. Id. Under present regulations, prior to
accepting wastewater, the publicly owned treatment works (POTW) must notify the
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and both the POTW and the
DEC will determine the capability of the POTW to handle such wastewater. 40
C.F.R. 122.42(b) (2012).
National EPA standards could provide a more
comprehensive review of the capability of POTWs to treat fracking wastewater in
particular.
54. Letter from Russell E. Train, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Hugh
Carey,
Governor
of
N.Y.
(Oct.
28,
1975),
available at
http://www.northwestenvironmentaladvocates.org/nweafiles/NPDES_Letters/NY%2
0NPDES%20Approval%20Letter.pdf (authorizing Governor Carey to administer
the NPDES permit program).
55. David B. Caruso, Pa. Allows Dumping of Tainted Waters from Gas Boom,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/3/paallows-dumping-of-tainted-waters-from-gas-boom/?page=all. But see Jerry Zremski,
Fracking Boom Could Go Bust, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 13, 2011, at C1.
56. See, e.g., Mark Scheer, Flood of Comments Expected at Water Board
NIAGARA
GAZETTE,
Nov.
23,
2011,
http://niagaraMeeting,
gazette.com/local/x1295782769/Flood-of-comments-expected-at-Water-Boardmeeting; Charlie Specht, ‘Fracking’ Residue Poses Concerns in Falls, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, at D1.
57. OFFICE OF RESEACH & DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING RESEARCH STUDY 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov
/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf.
58. See Environmental Review Process for Natural Gas Exploration in the
Marcellus
Shale,
N.Y.
STATE
DEP’T
ENVTL.
CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/46288.html?showprintstyles (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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state, and local authority.59 Having rejected a vote on new regulations
governing gas development, the DRBC has imposed a de facto
moratorium on new drilling in the basin for an indefinite period of
time.60 The SRBC prohibits water withdrawal to the extent it
interferes with the regular withdrawal of another user of the River
and requires review and approval of all gas development projects61
that may affect interstate water quality or significantly impact the
comprehensive plan.62
C.

1.

New York State Law

Fracking on Hold

Although the DEC disputes the authority of these interstate bodies
to impose a moratorium on drilling in New York, the issue is moot
while a de facto moratorium imposed by the DEC continues. The
DEC’s Commissioner, Joe Martens, announced he may delay new
high-volume fracking permits until 2013 while the DEC reviews the
overwhelming number of public comments filed in response to the
Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact
Statement (SGEIS).63 Prior to the current de facto moratorium,

59. See generally DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN
COMPACT
(1961),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/regs/compa.pdf;
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM’N, ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION AND WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION OF
STATE OF NEW YORK (1965), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/
library/coduments/AA/NY-highres.pdf; SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM’N,
SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMPACT (1972), available at http://www.srbc.net/
about/srbc_compact.pdf.
60. James Gerken, Delaware River Basin Fracking Decision Delayed,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/11/23/delaware-river-basin-fracking-decision_n_1108141.html; Natural Gas
Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/
programs/natural/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (noting no new updates on the status of
regulations).
61. 18 C.F.R. § 806.4(a)(8) (2012).
62. Id. § 806.5(a). The standards for water withdrawals are found at 18 C.F.R. §
806.23.
63. DEC Commissioner Joe Martens, citing the significant number of comments
received by the agency during the notice and comment period on proposed permit
rules for gas drilling and the inability of other state agencies to finalize their hydraulic
fracturing reports on time, says “he can’t predict” whether hydraulic fracturing
permits will be issued in 2012. Karen DeWitt, Fracking Report Will Be Delayed, Says
New York’s Environmental Commissioner, WSKGNEWS (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://wskgnewsarchive.org/2011/10/25/fracking-report-will-be-delayed-says-newyorks-environmental-commissioner/.
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Former Governor Patterson mandated an official moratorium on all
new high-volume drilling permits while the DEC drafted a SGEIS.64
Governor Patterson’s moratorium ended in June 2011, yet no new
permits have been issued.65 Under the DEC’s Revised Draft SGEIS,
New York would have among the strictest rules governing fracking in
the nation.66
New York and other states distinguish between high-volume and
low-volume fracking.67 New York’s upcoming regulations will cover
only high-volume fracking operations,68 and this Note only addresses
the dispute over regulation of high-volume fracking. High-volume
fracking typically requires multiple stages of drilling and more than
300,000 gallons of fracking fluids.69 According to 2009 Division of
Mineral Resources statistics, there are 6,628 active natural gas wells,
including low-volume fracked wells, in New York State.70

2.

Environmental Conservation Law

The Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) established the DEC
to carry out New York’s environmental policy by improving natural
resource protection and coordinating among the federal, regional,
and local governments, and private organizations.71 DEC is charged
with adopting regulations and policies that encourage industrial,
commercial, residential, and community development; maximize
environmental benefits; and minimize the effects of less desirable
environmental conditions.72 New York’s legislature added to this
general mandate to regulate land use with the passage of the Oil, Gas
and Solution Mining Law.

64. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 58.
65. Id.
66. Compare REVISED DRAFT SGEIS, supra note 30, at 3-14 to 3-15 (barring
fracking within 2,000 feet of drinking water supplies, 500 feet of private wells, and
4,000 feet of the New York City and Syracuse watersheds), with 25 Pa. Code §
78.60(b)(7) (2013) (barring fracking within 100 feet of streams and wetlands and 200
feet of structures unless the applicant receives a waiver).
67. See, e.g., STATE OF MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, HIGH VOLUME
HYDRAULIC WELL COMPLETIONS (2011), available at http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/deq/SI_1-2011_353936_7.pdf.
68. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7.41 (2013).
69. REVISED DRAFT SGEIS, supra note 30, at 3–6.
70. New York Natural Gas & Oil Production, N.Y. ST. DEP’T ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1601.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013)
(follow “2009 zip file” hyperlink).
71. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 1-0101 (McKinney 2012).
72. Id. § 03-0301(1)(g).
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Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law

In 1971, the New York Legislature passed the Oil, Gas and
Solution Mining Law (OGS), amending the ECL, which entrusted the
DEC with the authority to regulate the state’s oil, gas, and mining
industry.73 The explicit policy goals of the OGS are to foster the
development of New York’s natural resources, prevent waste, and
protect the rights of private landowners and the public.74 The OGS
grants the DEC and its Commissioner powers to require—and set
standards for—the drilling, operating casing, plugging, and replugging of wells,75 as well as the power to specify the required
distance between wells and underground water sources.76 Further, the
DEC has exclusive authority to issue a permit to drill.77
The express regulatory scheme defines only a limited local role.
ECL section 23-0303(2) was amended in 1981 to read, “[t]he
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas, and solution mining
industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over
local roads or the rights of local governments under the real property
tax.”78 The prior version did not include the phrase “shall supersede
all local laws or ordinances.”79 At its discretion, the DEC may seek
the cooperation of local authorities to enforce regulations proposed
and adopted by the DEC.80 Otherwise, the recipients of DEC-issued
drilling permits must notify the local government prior to the
commencement of drilling operations, and nothing more.81 Even in
the case of municipal property damage, the local government is
directed to go through the DEC to request reimbursement.82
At first glance, the provision appears to grant complete authority
to the DEC to override all local laws that interfere with gas

73. Id. § 23-0301.
74. Id.
75. Id. § 23-0305(8)(d).
76. Id. § 23-0503 (“The [DEC] shall issue a permit to drill, deepen, plug back or
convert a well, if the proposed spacing unit submitted to the department pursuant to
paragraph a of subdivision 2 of section 23-0501 of this title conforms to statewide
spacing.”).
77. Id. § 23-0305.
78. Id. § 23-0303(2).
79. In re Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
80. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-0305(11).
81. Id. § 23-0305(13).
82. Id. § 23-0303(3)(a).
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regulation.
However, in prior decisions involving statutory
construction of similar language, the Court of Appeals has read the
language, “shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the
regulation,” narrowly.83 Essentially, state law would supersede a
limited spectrum of local laws.
Up until 2012, there was only one reported decision addressing
ECL section 23-0303(2). In Envirogas, Inc v. Town of Kiantone, the
Chatauqua County Supreme Court invalidated a town zoning
ordinance that mandated the payment of a $2,500 compliance bond
and a $25 permit fee prior to construction of a gas or oil well.84 Under
the Envirogas court’s construction of the statute, a local law or
ordinance that reasonably relates to the regulation of the gas industry
will be struck down.85 Imposing local compliance bonds and permit
fees on gas drillers reasonably relates to the gas industry; therefore,
the court struck down the local ordinances.86
The two 2012 courts that interpreted section 23-0303 found
preemption analysis key to upholding zoning ordinances banning
fracking within a town’s jurisdiction.87 In Anschutz Exploration Corp.
v. Town of Dryden, the court analyzed section 23-0303(2)’s second
clause exempting “local government jurisdiction over local roads or
the rights of local governments under the real property tax” from
state jurisdiction.88 The plaintiff in Dryden argued that OGS carves
out two physical areas—roads and real property taxes—within which
a local government has not been preempted.89 Therefore, according
to the plaintiff, state law preempts regulation of any other physical
area or site.90 In rejecting this interpretation, the court found
regulation of local roads relates to physical area and to gas drilling
operations: “[r]egulation of local roads . . . would plainly relate to
operation of gas wells by directly affecting access to well sites or other

83. See, e.g., In re Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226
(N.Y. 1996); In re Frew Run Gravel Prods. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y.
1987).
84. See Envirogas, Inc., 447 N.Y.S.2d at 221–22.
85. See id. at 223.
86. See id.
87. See Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722,
724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940
N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
88. Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 468 (quoting N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303
(McKinney 2012)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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areas of operation and by imposing additional burdens or costs.”91
State law does not preempt local road regulation, which includes
matter related to local road regulation. The physical location of
natural gas wells to be used for fracking is a matter related to local
road regulation. Thus, the Town of Dryden can freely regulate the
physical location of a gas drilling well and can also regulate gasdrilling operations to the extent that they relate to local roads or real
property taxes.92 Any analysis of preemption necessarily starts with a
discussion of the origin of local regulatory authority.93

4.

Preemption

Article IX of the New York State Constitution confers broad
police power on local governments to regulate matters involving the
public welfare.94 The constitution directs the Legislature to “enact,
and . . . from time to time amend, a statute of local governments
granting to local governments powers including but not limited to
those of local legislation and administration in addition to . . . powers
vested in them by [the constitution].”95 The constitution further
stipulates that once the “statute of local governments” is enacted, the
State will have limited ability to override its reach:
A power granted in [the statute of local governments] may be
repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended only by enactment of a
statute by the legislature with the approval of the governor at its
regular session in one calendar year and the re-enactment and
approval of such statute in the following calendar year.96

This procedural rule, a significant restriction on state action, is known
as the “double enactment procedure”97 or “re-enactment,”98 and plays
a pivotal role in the future application of this constitutional provision.
91. Id.
92. See id.; see also Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730 (noting OGS’s
legislative history “clearly demonstrates the state’s interest in regulating the
‘activities,’ i.e., the manner and method, of the industry”).
93. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y.
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y.
1987), aff’d, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (N.Y. 1981).
94. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1); see also N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc., 505
N.E.2d at 917; De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d at 1261.
95. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1).
96. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(1); see N.Y. STAT. LOCAL GOV’TS § 2 (McKinney
2012) (“statute of local governments”).
97. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. 1977). The
procedure is known as “double enactment” because the legislation must be adopted
twice in successive legislative sessions.
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Additionally, the constitution granted that in the absence of state
action in a field, the local government may have authority to act first:
[E]very local government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or
any general law relating to the following subjects, whether or not
they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local
government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict
the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property,
affairs or government of such local government.99

A later statute, however, repealed this power to the extent it goes
beyond local authority over matters relating to “property, affairs or
government of local government.”100 Where “property, affairs or
government of local government” are involved, courts find the
Legislature has either not acted with regard to the subject matter, or
explicitly carved out an area in which the local government may act.101
Reading local authority in these situations broadly, courts rarely
preclude local regulation if the subject matter of the regulation relates
to the public welfare.
The “statute of local governments,” enacted pursuant to
constitutional mandate, outlines the general scope of the legislative
and administrative powers endowed in local government.102 These
powers include: “The power to adopt, amend and repeal ordinances,
resolutions and rules and regulations in the exercise of [the local
government’s] functions, powers and duties.”103 State legislation and
case precedent more succinctly illustrate the extent of local authority.
New York’s Town Law provides some guidance as to the zoning
authority of local governments.104 The statute empowers the town
board to regulate and restrict “the location and use of buildings,

98. County of Nassau v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 920 N.Y.S.2d 873, 883
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011); see also Michael E. Kenneally & Todd M. Mathes, Natural Gas
Production & Municipal Home Rule in New York, 10 N.Y. ZONING L. & PRAC. REP.
(West) at 1 (Jan./Feb. 2010).
99. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c).
100. LOCAL GOV’TS § 11(4); see also Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 920
N.Y.S.2d at 883.
101. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
102. LOCAL GOV’TS § 10. The “statute of local governments” also restates the reenactment procedure for State regulation affecting local governance of “property,
affairs or government.” Id. § 12(1).
103. Id. § 10(1). With regard to cities, towns, and villages, where such local entity
maintains jurisdiction over the surrounding area, the entity may adopt, repeal, and
amend zoning ordinances regarding the surrounding area. Id.§ 10(6).
104. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 2012).
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structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes;
provided that such regulations shall apply to and affect only such part
of a town as is outside the limits of any incorporated village or city.”105
This authority over land use has been construed as the local
government zoning authority. Accordingly, the town board may
divide the area within its jurisdiction into districts of different
permitted uses.106 Town regulations for each district are created in
light of a town’s objective, and not the purpose of each district.107
Once a town adopts a comprehensive plan, all town land use
regulations must be consistent with that plan.108 Unless the plan is
found to be ad hoc or subservient to special interests, it will be
presumed valid.109 The plan may contain “material that identif[ies]
the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards,
devices and instruments for the immediate and long-range protection,
enhancement, growth and development of the town located outside
the limits of any incorporated village or city.”110
The power to create zones of different permissible land uses has
been gradually developed by precedent. Case law defines the
implementation of a zoning ordinance as “essentially a legislative
act.”111 The purpose of zoning is “to regulate land use generally.”112
Implicit in the authority to regulate land use is the right to limit the
uses to which property may be put.113 A zoning ordinance prohibiting
a certain activity does not make the activity itself illegal; it makes it
illegal for the individual to use the land in the manner proscribed by

105. Id. § 261.
106. Id. § 262.
107. Id. § 263; see also Connell v. Town of Granby, 209 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1961).
108. TOWN § 272-a(11); see also Infinity Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Town of
Huntington, 854 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). Since Ramapo, the Court
of Appeals has conducted stricter review of town plans where the court finds local
control has had “crippling efforts toward regional and State-wide problem solving.”
John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of StateInterests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497, 498 (1993) (citing In re
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972)).
109. TOWN § 263; see also Randolph v. Brookhaven, 337 N.E.2d 763, 765 (N.Y.
1975); Udell v. Hass, 235 N.E.2d 897, 897 (N.Y. 1968) (“[Defendant must make an
adequate] showing that the change does not conflict with the community’s basic
scheme for land use.”).
110. TOWN § 272-a(11).
111. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243 (N.Y. 1975).
112. Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y.
1987).
113. Young v. City of Binghamton, 447 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
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the ordinance.114 This distinction illustrates the difference between
state power to outlaw an activity, and local power to limit land uses.
Therefore, a zoning ordinance prohibiting gas drilling would not
make gas drilling illegal per se, but it would make gas drilling illegal
within a certain area.
State and local authority to regulate land use generally overlap in
many areas, and their overlapping does not necessarily mean one is
prohibited, or preempted, from regulating in that area.115 If state and
local legislation are “inconsistent,” then one will be invalidated.116 If
the latter is to be invalidated, then state law has preempted local
regulation. Inconsistent regulation likely inhibits the effectiveness of
state regulation, and thwarts state policy concerns.117 Inconsistency,
and thus preemption, occurs in one of two ways: (1) the local law
directly conflicts with the state law;118 or (2) the State Legislature has
evidenced its intent to regulate exclusively the subject matter, or
field.119
A direct conflict arises where local government is prohibited from
taking a certain action; specifically, if the local law permits action
specifically prohibited by state law or local law removes rights
specifically granted to persons by state law.120 Naturally, direct

114. See Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 397, 397 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
115. See, e.g., Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417
N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that the court never construed the principle of
pre-emption so broadly that the mere fact that the State deals with a subject it
automatically pre-empts it); Sonmax, Inc. v. City of New York, 372 N.E.2d 9, 12
(N.Y. 1977) (“[L]ack of uniformity is [not] the same as inconsistency or
contradiction.”); People v. Lewis, 64 N.E.2d 702, 704 (N.Y. 1945) (“Laws dealing with
the same subject matter are not necessarily incompatible because not identical.”).
116. See, e.g., Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930 (N.Y.
1991); Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1987);
Ames v. Smoot, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130–31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
117. See Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905–06.
118. Only recently has direct conflict been considered a form of preemption. See,
e.g., Dougal v. County of Suffolk, 477 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984).
119. See, e.g., DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 190 (N.Y.
2001); Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905; Sunrise Check Cashing & Payroll Servs., Inc. v.
Town of Hempstead, 933 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
120. See Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 905. Prior to Jancyn, courts found inconsistency
where the local law permitted action barred under state law and where the local law
barred action under State law. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987); People v. Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457 (N.Y.
1974); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862,
864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 189 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y. 1963). If the prior rule had
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conflicts are less common when local legislation prohibits actions that
are permissible under state law.121
The state law governing solid waste management and resource
recovery facilities is an example of concurrent state and local
regulation.122 The Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery
Facilities Law reads, “[a]ny local laws, ordinances or regulations of
any governing body of a county, city, town or village which are not
inconsistent with this title or with any rule or regulation which shall
be promulgated pursuant to this title shall not be superseded by it.”123
By its plain language, the statute welcomes local variations of the
state law, as long as the local variation is consistent with state
regulation.124 In Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Town of
Caledonia, the court upheld an ordinance that set a stricter standard
than that stated in the state statute.125 The local ordinance imposed a
condition on the collection of refuse under the state statute: refuse
generated outside of the Town of Caledonia will only be accepted at
facilities licensed by the Caledonia if the Town Board authorizes it
and such receipt is consistent with the regional comprehensive solid
waste management plan.126
In People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., a case dealing with
criminal nuisance, the court did not find explicit statutory language
outlining the local regulatory role.127 Instead, the court looked
beyond the state statute at issue to find legislative intent that the
municipality could regulate.128 Per State Penal Law, a person is guilty
of criminal nuisance if, “he knowingly or recklessly creates or
maintains a condition which endangers the safety or health of a

been applied literally there could never be a local variation of state law that would
withstand judicial review.
121. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226,
1235 (N.Y. 1996) (upholding a local zoning ordinance that further narrowed the area
within which mining is a permissible land use).
122. See Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417
N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980).
123. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0711 (McKinney 2012).
124. Monroe-Livingston, 417 N.E.2d at 80.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 80. If a person has received a state-issued permit to conduct an
activity that the local government concurrently regulates, the person must still abide
by local law. See id.
127. 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1982) (“There is nothing in section 240.45 of the
Penal Law, the criminal nuisance statute, to indicate an intention by the Legislature,
directly or indirectly, to restrict the town’s power to enact a noise ordinance.”).
128. See id. at 1225.
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considerable number of persons.”129 For issues of state-local power,
the Municipal Home Rule Law demands a broad reading of local
authority to regulate the field of public welfare.130 The challenged
zoning ordinance expanded the application of criminal nuisance to
include “unnecessary noise” that “annoys, disturbs, injures or
endangers the comfort, repose, health, peace or safety of a person.”131
The court found local regulation of criminal nuisance permissible
absent statutory language to the contrary.132 Here, the state law was
silent regarding local authority, and the court found the local
government may regulate where the subject matter is reasonably
related to local public welfare.133
In Walker v. Town of Hempstead, the town ordinance at issue
required prior notification to the town government before any defect
in a public space could be used as reason to file an action against the
local government.134 However, the state statute read, “[n]o other or
further notice . . . shall be required as a condition to the
commencement of an action” against the local government.135
Impliedly, there are permissible local variations in the field of civil
litigation against the local government, but additional conditions on
filing procedures is not one of them. The end result is quite similar to
the cases above wherein local variations of state regulation are
“inconsistent” with state regulation and thereby ultra vires if local
regulations are weaker.
A state statute that expressly prohibits136 or preempts137 local law
precludes exercise of the supersession authority by indicating a desire

129. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2012).
130. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 2012).
131. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d at 1224 (citing Town of Poughkeepsie
Unnecessary Noise Control Ordinance § 3.01).
132. Id. (“[L]ocal governments have been given broad authority to adopt
ordinances governing the safety, health and well-being of those within their
jurisdictions.”). If, on the other hand, statutory silence were interpreted to prohibit
local regulation of the subject matter, it “would vitiate the concept of home rule.”
Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984).
133. See N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1982).
134. 643 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. 1994).
135. Id.
136. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 2012); see Walker,
643 N.E.2d at 79.
137. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 349 (N.Y. 1989); Albany Area
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1989).
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to prohibit “the possibility of varying local legislation.”138 The
overriding authority of the State to preempt local legislation
embodies “the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to act, as it
always had, with respect to matters of state concern.”139 Due to the
broad scope of the State’s police power,140 the absence of statutory
purpose to preclude local variation of state legislation implies that the
State intended that the local government have authority to regulate.141
However, the absence of preemption alone is not enough for a local
government to take action;142 as stated above, the local government
must derive its authority expressly from a state statute or the
constitution.143
Intent to preempt may be signaled by several indicators. The four
most prominent indicators are: (1) express language providing for
exclusivity; (2) the nature of the subject matter being regulated; (3)
the scope of the state legislative scheme; and (4) the need for
statewide uniformity.144 The presence of any one of these indicators is
sufficient to find legislative intent to preempt the subject matter.145

138. Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v. Town of Caledonia, 417 N.E.2d 78, 80
(N.Y. 1980); see also Council for Owner Occupied Hous., Inc. v. Koch, 462 N.Y.S.2d
762, 764, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), aff’d, 463 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1984) (“[O]nly when the
state has evidenced a desire to occupy the entire field to the exclusion of local law [is]
a municipality powerless to act.”).
139. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1977).
140. Cf. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 708–09 (N.Y. 1929) (finding substantial
“state concern” in New York City housing).
141. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (N.Y. 1981); People v.
Cook, 312 N.E.2d 452, 455–56 (N.Y. 1974).
142. See Ames v. Smoot, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (“A municipal
corporation is a political subdivision of the State and its lawmaking authority can be
exercised only to the extent that it has been delegated by the State.”).
143. Generally, courts have cited the Municipal Home Rule Law for the source of
local authority to adopt laws relating to local “property, affairs or government.” See,
e.g., Walker v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 78 (N.Y. 1994); Kamhi v. Town of
Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348–49 (N.Y. 1989). Therefore, the legal issue of whether
the state law has infringed on constitutionally protected local governance rights is
rarely raised.
144. Ames, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 130–31; see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York,
749 N.E.2d 186, 192 (N.Y. 2001) (finding no preemption because the declaration of
policy does not evidence legislative intent to remove local legislation of the matter
and the regulatory scheme is not detailed and comprehensive); Inc. Vill. of Nyack v.
Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 930–31 (N.Y. 1991) (same).
145. See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d
920, 922 (N.Y. 1989) (“comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme” in the field of
highway funding); Ames, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 130–31 (finding express language providing
for exclusivity and a detailed and comprehensive regulatory scheme).
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In Albany Area Builders Association v. Town of Guilderland, the
Town of Guilderland imposed a transportation “impact fee” on all
“applicants for building permits who seek to make a change in land
use that will make additional traffic.”146 The fee fund was intended to
pay for the expansion of the local roadway system and local
transportation facilities.147 However, the State had already adopted
an “elaborate budget system” delineating “how towns are to budget
for improvements and repairs to highways,” putting a cap on town
highway taxes, and dictating the procedures towns must adhere to in
developing their roadway budget.148 Based on its finding of a
comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme, the court held that
the State evinced its purpose to preempt the entire field of roadway
funding, thereby precluding local legislation on the subject.149
On the other hand, local legislation is not preempted where it will
only have an incidental effect on a comprehensive and detailed
regulatory scheme.150 DJL Restaurant Corporation v. City of New
York is illustrative of this concept. In DJL, New York City amended
its zoning ordinance to limit “adult establishments” to manufacturing
and high-density commercial zoning districts.151 Not only did the
ordinance limit the siting of establishments providing only adult
entertainment, but also those businesses serving as both “adult
establishments” and bars.152 The State preempts the field of alcohol
distribution under the Alcohol Beverage Control Law (ABC),153 and
the Law contains several provisions regarding nudity in bars and the

146. Albany Area Builders Ass’n, 546 N.E.2d at 921.
147. Id. at 921.
148. Id. at 922–23 (citing N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 102, 104, 107 (McKinney 1989); N.Y.
HIGHWAY LAW §§ 141, 271 (McKinney 1989)).
149. Id. at 923. In Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Red Hook,
the Court of Appeals held that a local zoning ordinance was preempted partially
based on the state law’s establishment of a Siting Board that “is required to
determine whether any municipal laws or regulations governing the construction or
operation of a proposed generating facility are unreasonably restrictive, and has the
power to waive compliance with such municipal regulations.” 456 N.E.2d 487, 490
(N.Y. 1983).
150. See, e.g., DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y.
2001); Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35
(N.Y. 1996) (citing Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920,
922 (N.Y. 1987)).
151. DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d at 188–89 (citing N.Y.C. Amended Zoning Resolutions
§§ 32-01(b), 42-01(b)).
152. Id. at 189.
153. Id. at 190 (citing In re Landsdown Entm’t Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Consumer
Affairs, 543 N.E.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. 1989)).
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siting of such establishments.154 The court read ABC as narrowly
tailored to “promot[ing] temperance in the consumption of alcoholic
beverages,” which is distinct from the regulation of land.155 Zoning is
meant to regulate land use, not “the consumption of alcoholic
beverages.”156 Invariably, regulations of these two distinct fields will
impact one another, but such “incidental control” is permissible
within preemption157: “separate levels of regulatory oversight can
coexist.”158
Even a detailed regulatory scheme may be insufficient to preempt
where local regulation is not explicitly addressed.159 For example, in
Village of Nyack v. Daytop Village, Daytop Village received state
approval to open a substance abuse program in a commercial district
where residential uses were specifically prohibited.160 Based on the
comprehensive regulatory scheme embodied in Article 19 of the
Mental Hygiene Law, the Appellate Division determined additional
restrictions imposed by the local government “would clearly impose
additional restrictions on rights granted by State law and thereby
‘tend to inhibit the operation of the State’s general law and thereby
thwart the operation of the State’s overriding policy concerns.’”161
Yet the Court of Appeals reversed, finding no “inherent
inconsistency” between the regulations.162 For the local government
to retain authority over the siting of substance abuse programs is not
“inconsistent” with the state agency’s authority to manage the
program.163 Notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of the statute,
without clear intent to divest local government of its zoning authority,
the municipality will continue to exercise supersession authority.164
Express language providing for exclusivity, and thus preemption, is
found where the statute is interpreted to intend to omit a certain term

154. Id. at 190 (citing N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 106(6-a) (McKinney 2012)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 191; see also Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518
N.E.2d 920, 920 (N.Y. 1987)).
158. DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d at 191 (citing Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc.,
583 N.E.2d 928, 931 (N.Y. 1991)).
159. See, e.g., Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 929; N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of
New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917–18 (N.Y 1987).
160. Daytop Vill., 583 N.E.2d at 929.
161. Id. (quoting N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d at 917).
162. Id. at 929.
163. Id. at 930–31.
164. See id.
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or criterion.165 Unlike where the statute’s silence implies a carve-out
for local regulation, the statutes that are read to expressly preclude
local amendment tend to contain some type of list of permissible or
impermissible activity.166 The method of statutory construction that
reads a statute to include only the listed items and exclude all other
items is expressio unius est exclusio alterius: where a law expressly
describes a particular act to which it shall apply, an irrefutable
inference must be drawn that what is omitted was intended to be
omitted.167 This maxim only has force when the items expressed are
members of an associated group such that legislative intent to exclude
other members of a grouping is clear.168
For example, under New York’s Retirement and Social Security
Law, the salary base upon which future pensions are calculated
expressly excludes lump sum payments, termination pay, payment in
lieu of retirement, and the portion of compensation over one year
that exceeds the previous year’s compensation by more than twenty
percent.169 The listing of these four exclusions led the Court of
Appeals to find the State Legislature did not intend to exclude any
other items from the calculation of salary for future pension
purposes.170
If there is neither express preemption of local action nor an express
carve out for local authority in a field of regulation, courts will move
on to implicit preemption.171 For implicit preemption, courts will
examine the declaration of policy accompanying the legislation or a

165. See, e.g., City of New York v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 489 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985); People v. Ceasar, 727 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
166. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d
174, 179–80 (N.Y. 2002); Walker v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 79 (N.Y.
1994).
167. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2012); see also Jewish Home &
Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. v. Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640
N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y. 1994); N.Y. Tel. Co., 489 N.Y.S.2d at 476; Ceasar, 727 N.Y.S.2d
at 259. But see Erie County v. Whalen, 394 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977),
aff’d, 377 N.E.2d 984 (N.Y. 1978) (“[A]lthough a useful tool of statutory
construction,’ [expressio unius est exclusio alterius] must not be utilized to defeat the
purpose of an enactment or to override the manifest legislative intent.” (citing
Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 280 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967))).
168. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2007).
169. Weingarten, 780 N.E.2d at 179 (citing N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 431
(McKinney 2002)).
170. See id. at 179.
171. See People ex rel. Spitzer v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 894 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y.
2008).
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comprehensive detailed regulatory scheme.172 Similarly, to express
preemption, where courts find legislative intent to regulate without
concurrent local regulation, the court will strike down an ordinance
that infringes on state authority.173 In Consolidated Edison Company
of New York, Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, the Court of Appeals found
enlightening a declaration accompanying the enactment of the state
statute and statements made by both Governor Rockefeller and
Governor Carey during their respective terms about the bill.174 There,
each statement raised the issue of a conflicting series of patchwork
regulations that caused significant bureaucratic delays in the “field of
siting major steam electric generating plants.”175
The declaration of policy may also be more explicit in claiming the
State’s authority, and will likely be deemed implicit preemption:
“[The State’s] department of health shall have the central,
comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration
of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and related
services . . . .”176 In Robin, a local ordinance prohibited hospitals not
accredited by the State Department of Health from conducting
abortions.177 The State Penal Law, which regulated permissible
abortions, only required a “duly licensed physician” and that the
woman seeking the abortion “act[] under a reasonable belief that
such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks
from the commencement of her pregnancy.”178 The local town
ordinance had added to hospital-related services by adopting an
ordinance requiring abortions to occur in hospitals, and thus acted
contrary to the implicit intent of the legislature.179 Additionally, the

172. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (N.Y. 1981); Robin v. Inc.
Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 286 (N.Y. 1972).
173. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905–06 (N.Y.
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y 1987);
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y.
1983).
174. See Consol. Edison Co., 456 N.E.2d at 490.
175. Id.
176. Robin, 285 N.E.2d at 286 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See id. at 286.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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ordinance was contrary to legislative intent to regulate abortionrelated services on a statewide basis.180
Local governments derive authority to enact local laws with respect
to local governance issues from the New York Constitution and
Municipal Home Rule Law.181 The vast majority of state laws will
likely impact local governance. Where a state and local law
concurrently regulate a person, corporation, or activity, and the court
is asked to resolve inconsistencies between the relevant laws, the
court will conduct preemption analysis.182 If a state law does not
contain express language demonstrating the state regulates
exclusively over the subject, then the reviewing court will review the
state law for language implying the state law regulates exclusively.183
If the state law only implicitly regulates the subject, then courts have
some discretion to read state law in a manner that allows for some
degree of local regulation of the subject.184

5.

New York State Constitution and Home Rule Law

In theory, the New York Constitution provides the easy solution to
the OGS provision. Courts, however, have not applied the plain
meaning of the provision. Article IX of the constitution dictates that
the State Legislature must follow a unique set of adoption procedures
whenever it passes legislation affecting local government affairs.185
Where the procedure is not followed, the local government retains
superseding authority over the field.
First, Article IX directs the Legislature to adopt a “statute of local
governments” that will define local government affairs. The statute
grants local governments broad authority to enact local laws with
respect to local governmental affairs, such as the levy and collection
of taxes, public order, welfare, and safety.186 Included among these
powers is the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal zoning
ordinances regarding local land usage.187
180. See id. But see generally People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222,
1224–25 (N.Y. 1982) (finding a state statute’s silence does not preclude the adoption
of a local ordinance expanding the application of a state law).
181. See supra notes 83, 137 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., City of Buffalo v. Lewis, 84 N.E. 809, 811 (N.Y. 1908).
184. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d
174, 177–80 (N.Y. 2002).
185. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i).
186. Id. §§ 2(c)(i), 2(c)(ii)(10).
187. Id. § 2(b)(i).
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Second, any State legislation that repeals, diminishes, or impairs
the powers reserved to the local government under the “statute of
local governments” must adhere to a double re-enactment procedure.
Once the infringing legislation is approved by the State Legislature
and signed by the Governor in a regular session, it must be re-enacted
and approved by the Legislature and the Governor the following
year.188 Seemingly, therefore, any law that would impair the power of
a local government to adopt zoning ordinances, including ECL
section 23-0303(2), would be subject to the re-enactment requirement
of Article IX, section 2(b)(i) of the New York Constitution. ECL
section 23-0303(2) was enacted in 1971 and amended in 1982, each by
a single enactment.189
The Home Rule provision was first added to the constitution in
1894.190 The principle of Home Rule was strengthened in a 1923
amendment.191 Adler v. Deegan is one of the first cases to confront its
scope. The court in Adler first established the concept of “substantial
state concern” as a reason not to follow the double re-enactment
procedure required by the constitution for all matters relating to local
property, affairs, or government.192 In that case, New York City sued
to enjoin the State from enforcing the Multiple Dwelling Law as it
conflicted with local law.193 Chief Justice Cardozo, in a concurring
opinion that has been cited in a majority of the opinions on the
distinction between state and municipal authority, distinguished
between the City’s law and zoning resolutions.194 Cardozo’s test is if
“the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state concern, the
Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are concerns of the
locality.”195 Cardozo explicitly notes, however, that a municipality
will not be preempted from taking any action within the field.196 In
this sense, state action in a field of local concern is substantially
different from ordinary preemption.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.

Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 2.
See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 706–07 (N.Y. 1929).
See id. at 713.
See id. at 713–14.
See id. at 706.
See id. at 711–12 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 713–14.
Id. at 712; see also James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York:
“The Ghost of Home Rule,” 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 718 (“[L]ocal regulation
could be adopted to add additional protections, as long as the city’s involvement is
consistent with the powers of the State.”).
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Preempting the municipality from acting altogether would be a
totally different question than whether the State may act.197 In the
instance of urban slums, both the State and the municipality have
authority to regulate issues of public welfare, and thus are in the
position to enact laws or ordinances.198 Or, as Cardozo put it, “[t]he
concern of the state to protect the health and welfare of its
inhabitants may not stand in the way of action by the city consistent
with the ends envisaged by the state, but adding greater safeguards
with reference to related ends that are municipal or urban.”199 Even
where the State has acted, the municipality may step in to regulate as
long as the municipality only adds to standards, restrictions, or
conditions set forth in the state statute.200 These added restrictions fit
within the municipality’s authority to enact ordinances that further
the public welfare.
Courts rarely find a statute triggers the constitution’s local
authority provision. In deciding against applying the complicated
procedure required per the constitution, courts have regularly cited
Cardozo for the proposition that a strong reading of the provision
would overrule years of precedent.201 Thus, an issue only must be a
matter of substantial state concern for the State Legislature to have
the authority to regulate in the field.202 In Floyd v. New York State
Urban Development Corp., the statute in question laid out the
procedures for local challenge of a state action to build in a zoning
district wherein such construction was prohibited.203
If the
municipality challenged the state action, then it was still within the
state’s discretion whether to build in the zoning district at issue.204
The court took a further step in the direction of state authority in
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York.205
Prior to the Wambat decision, the Home Rule provision of the
New York State Constitution was amended in 1963. The 1963 Home

197. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
198. N.Y. STAT. LOC. GOVTS. § 11(4) (McKinney 2012).
199. Adler, 167 N.E. at 712 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
200. See id. (“There can be no legitimate concern of the state, or none at least is
now suggested, that would throw open Murray Hill to industry and trade, if the city
authorities were to hold fast to the belief that it should be preserved for residences
only.”).
201. See, e.g., Whalen v. Wagner, 152 N.E.2d 54, 56 (N.Y. 1958).
202. See Bugeja v. City of New York, 266 N.Y.S.2d 80, 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965).
203. See 300 N.E.2d 704, 705 (N.Y. 1973).
204. See id. at 706.
205. 362 N.E.2d 581, 586–87 (N.Y. 1977).
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Rule Amendment was “intended to expand and secure the powers
enjoyed by local governments.”206 Concurrently, the Municipal Home
Rule Law and the Statute of Local Governments were amended to
mandate that they be “liberally construed.”207 The amended Home
Rule Law, however, maintained the previously narrowly construed
language that the Legislature could pass any law that did not affect
“property, affairs or government” of a locality.208 The retention of
that phrase led many scholars to predict the amendment would have
no effect on the judicial interpretation of home rule.209
In Wambat, the Adirondack Park Agency Act established a
comprehensive zoning plan affecting 119 local governments, thereby
encroaching on local zoning power.210 The court found two subsidiary
issues key to the resolution: (1) whether the subject is a matter of
state concern; and (2) whether the constitution’s re-enactment
requirement applies to matters of state concern.211 In arriving at its
conclusion, the court assumed matters of state concern necessarily
relate to “other than the property, affairs or government of local
government.”212
Under such a reading of Article IX, the
Constitution’s re-enactment procedure is never triggered when the
matter is of State concern. Moreover, the two subsidiary issues would
collapse into one issue, because matters of state concern are not
matters that would trigger the constitution’s re-enactment procedure.
The Wambat court narrowly interpreted Article IX not to impact
areas of the law covered by existing state regulatory bodies.213
Wambat holds, “The price of strong local government may not be the
destruction or even the serious impairment of strong State
interests.”214 On the other hand, later cases have found state and local
authority often intermingle.215 Hotel Dorset Company v. Trust for

206. Id. at 585.
207. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1963).
208. N.Y. CONST. art. IX § 3.
209. See J.D. Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941–1965: Retrospect & Prospect,
15 BUFF. L. REV. 335, 338–48 (1965).
210. See Wambat, 362 N.E.2d at 584.
211. Id. at 582.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 586–87.
215. See, e.g., Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Res. of City of N.Y., 385
N.E.2d 1284, 1291–92 (N.Y. 1978); Farrington v. Pinckney, 133 N.E.2d 817, 824 (N.Y.
1956). Matters that affect local zoning ordinances are subjected to greater scrutiny
due to the strong local interest in maintaining zoning, or siting, as an exercise of
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Cultural Resources of City of New York held that a state statute that
has the appropriate level of state interest will not be rendered invalid
by its operation in a field that is also of local concern as long as the
enactment is reasonable and related to the State’s purpose.216
Accordingly, matters of state concern may also be matters of local
concern, suggesting that concurrent state and local regulation is a
possibility.
In City of New York et. al. v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association
of City of New York, Inc, the State did not provide evidence that its
legislation would serve its stated ends better than the local law, and
the court struck the state law.217 A 1974 state statute exempted New
York City from the mandated use of the State’s arbitration board to
resolve collective bargaining negotiations with government
employees, because the City had already created its own arbitration
board.218 Without following the double re-enactment procedure, the
State Legislature eliminated the exemption from the City by passing a
statute purporting to give the State’s arbitration board the exclusive
authority over negotiations between the City and city police.219
Returning to Cardozo’s concurring opinion in Adler, the Court of
Appeals adopted a two-part test: “the subject [must] be in a
substantial degree a matter of State concern,” and the “subjects of
State concern [must be] directly and substantially involved.”220
Assuming arguendo the State has a substantial interest in the
uniformity of impasse procedures available to police department
members and in a fairer forum for bargaining, the court found no
reasonable relationship between those interests and the means
adopted to achieve them.221 Further, the State provided no evidence
that the City-provided forum was unfair relative to the State’s
arbitration board.222 Thus, the local law that is more effective at
achieving the State’s stated interests was upheld.

exclusive local power. Town of Monroe v. Carey, 412 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942–43 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 386 N.E.2d 1335 (N.Y. 1979).
216. Hotel Dorset, 385 N.E.2d at 1291–92.
217. See City of New York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y., 676
N.E.2d 847, 853 (N.Y. 1996).
218. See id. at 848–49.
219. See id. at 849.
220. Id. at 851–52.
221. See id. at 853.
222. See id.
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Mined Land Reclamation Law

Absent significant case precedent interpreting the OGS, courts are
likely to rely on the courts’ interpretation of an analogous provision
in the Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL), which gives the DEC
authority to adopt regulations and issue permits to develop land that
concurrently falls under local jurisdiction. The MLRL’s initial
supersession clause read,
[T]his title shall supersede all other state and local laws relating to
the extractive mining industry; provided, however, that nothing in
this title shall be construed to prevent any local government from
enacting . . . local zoning ordinances or laws which impose stricter
mined land reclamation standards or requirements than those found
herein.223

Prior to MLRL enactment, some municipalities regulated local
mining activity.224 The plain meaning of the clause precludes such
local legislation.225 Further, the Bill Jacket characterizes the MLRL
as establishing a statewide uniform law to replace the local patchwork
of regulations based on little to no technical expertise.226 As for local
ordinances that clash with the statewide law, the MLRL established a
procedure whereby the DEC will review zoning ordinances, and
potentially include restrictions within the permit, while reserving the
right to cast local ordinances aside.227
Two seminal decisions, Frew Run Gravel Products v. Town of
Carroll228 and Gernatt Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Town of Sardinia,229
are of particular importance. The Court of Appeals held in both
cases that local zoning ordinances did not relate to the extractive
mining industry, and therefore were not preempted under New

223. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-2703(2) (McKinney 1997).
224. Joan Leary Matthews, Siting Mining Operations in New York–The Mined
Land Reclamation Law Supersession Provision, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 9, 11
(1999).
225. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226,
1235 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920,
922 (N.Y. 1987)).
226. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923 (citing Memorandum in Support of Assembly
Bill 10463-A, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION Bill Jacket, L. 1974, c.
1043 (May 31, 1964)).
227. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-2711(3) (“If the [DEC] finds that the determinations
made by the local government . . . are reasonable and necessary, the department shall
incorporate these into the permit, if one is issued.”).
228. 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987).
229. 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1986)

HOOKER_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

ZONING OUT FRACKING

5/27/2013 7:26 PM

899

York’s MLRL. The MLRL contains language regarding the State’s
scope of regulatory authority that is very similar to the language in
the OGS.
Frew Run is the leading case on deciphering the extent to which
the municipality is precluded from legislating. In the case, the
landowner received a DEC-issued permit to mine sand and gravel on
his land in a zoning district wherein sand and gravel operations were
expressly prohibited by the town’s zoning ordinance.230 Though the
DEC had decided against the determinations of the local government,
the local government did not cease to enforce the zoning ordinance.231
Preemption analysis of statutory language involves examining certain
provisions for express language outlining local authority and the
whole statute for implicit preemption.232 Where express language is
found, judicial review will not include implicit preemption analysis.233
Due to the above express supersession clause detailing the scope of
the State’s regulatory authority, the court held the validity of the
ordinance to be determined by direct conflict preemption analysis.234
Under the MLRL, there is direct conflict between the two
regulatory bodies if the local law “relat[es] to the extractive mining
industry.”235 Thus, if the local law does not “relat[e] to the extractive
mining industry,” and is otherwise within local authority to enact, it
will be upheld.236 The zoning ordinance at issue in Frew Run
“regulat[es] the location, construction and use of buildings, structures,
and the use of land in the Town of Carroll, County of Chautauqua,
State of New York and for said purposes dividing the Town into
districts.”237 The purported reasons behind the adoption of the
MLRL and zoning ordinances are different, and the subject matter
they intend to regulate are different. The court held that “relating to
the extractive mining industry” does not include zoning ordinances,
230. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 923.
233. See id. at 921–23.
234. See id. at 922. In Frew Run and the literature analyzing the decision, implicit
preemption is distinguished from “express supersession,” wherein the statute
expressly carves out an area within the field of regulation for local regulation. Id.;
see, e.g., Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 1; Michelle L. Kennedy, The
Exercise of Local Control over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 375
(2011). Without changing the analysis, later decisions have placed “express
supersession” within preemption analysis.
235. Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
236. Id.
237. See id.
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which regulate land use generally; such local laws only exert
incidental control over any particular businesses and thus are not
preempted by ECL section 23-2703.238 Moreover, in later decisions,
the court extended exclusive local authority over land use regulation
in this arena to conditional zoning as long as the conditions did not
“relate to the extractive mining industry.”239
The court found support for its ruling in the MLRL’s legislative
history. Judicial review, even regarding a direct state-local conflict,
not only entails a glance over the applicable provision, but also an
examination of the legislative history and the statute as a whole.240
The Governor’s Bill Jacket and the separate requirements for mining
and mined land reclamation reinforce the notion that the Legislature
intended to retain local zoning authority in the hands of the
municipality.241 On the other hand, the MLRL established a
mechanism for the DEC to reject local zoning authority.242 Overall,
the MLRL sends conflicting messages regarding the local role in the
regulation of mining applicants, but the plain meaning of the
supersession clause clearly favors maintaining local zoning ordinances
that place higher restrictions on mining applicants than the MLRL.243
Frew Run established a framework for interpreting supersession
clauses and is key to future cases dealing with supersession authority.
Where the language regarding the State and local spheres of
regulation is express, “absen[t] a clear expression of legislative intent
238. See id. In Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, the Court
clarified that the local government may prohibit mining activity in every zoning
district. 664 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996).
239. See, e.g., Seaboard Contracting & Material, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown, 541
N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal dismissed, 547 N.E.2d 104, (N.Y.
1989), mot. for lv. den., 553 N.E.2d 1024 (N.Y. 1990) (upholding requirement on
“Heavy Industry” in zoning district that they may only,”operat[e] outside a 500–foot
radius of a residential district or a school or church or a similar place of public
assembly and must establish that the proposed mining operation would not produce a
significant adverse effect upon the environment”); Morrell v. C.I.D. Landfill, 510
N.Y.S.2d 395, 396 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), appeal den., 511 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 1986)
(upholding town ordinance conditioning approval of “excavation, stockpiling, and
sale of mineral matter” in residential and agricultural districts on whether operations
will create a nuisance and whether the area will be “safe and useful” upon
termination of operations).
240. See Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
241. See id. at 922–23 (citing N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 23-2705(8);
MEMORANDUM OF GOVERNOR WILSON FILED WITH ASSEMBLY BILL 10463-A
Governor’s Bill Jacket, L.1974, ch. 1043 (June 15, 1974)).
242. ENVTL. CONSERV. § 23-2711(3)(b) (McKinney 2012).
243. See, e.g., Ne. Mines, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 494 N.Y.S.2d
914, 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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to preempt local control over land use, the statute should not be read
as preempting local zoning authority.”244 The MLRL very clearly
expresses legislative intent to regulate the particulars of mining, but
any language from which may be inferred legislative intent to
override zoning ordinances is not nearly as express.245 Thus, the State
has not evinced a desire to preempt the entire land use field,246 and
the adoption of local zoning ordinances is not in direct conflict with
state legislation.247
II. LOCAL OR STATE RULE OVER LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Judicial review of local law entails reviewing state law and the
constitution for inconsistency.248 If no inconsistency is present and the
local government properly derives its authority to act pursuant to the
constitution or state law, the local law will be upheld.249 In the case of
fracking in New York, OGS is the relevant state law.250 The fracking
process requires the use of surface land and the use of the shale lying
below the surface.251 Thus, OGS implicates and, as demonstrated in
Part I, conflicts with local regulation of land uses.
Courts can examine the conflict between state and local law in one
of two ways. First, courts can conduct preemption analysis to
determine whether OGS places all gas-related regulation, including
the location of gas wells, exclusively within the state’s regulatory
authority.252 If a court ruling on this issue were to find the OGS
places the physical location of gas wells within the exclusive scope of
244. Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234 (N.Y.
1996).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 518 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y.
1987); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y 1987);
People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1239 (N.Y. 1982).
247. See, e.g., People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261 (N.Y. 1981); Robin v. Inc.
Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 287 (N.Y. 1972).
248. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 348 (N.Y. 1989);
Albany Area Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 921 (N.Y.
1989); Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d at 902.
249. See generally, e.g., Jancyn, 518 N.E.2d 903; N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 505 N.E.2d
915.
250. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (McKinney 2012).
251. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 19; see, e.g., Cooperstown Holstein
Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
252. See Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 724; Anschutz Exploration Corp.
v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); In re Envirogas, Inc.
v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d
694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
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the state’s regulatory authority, then the local government that
restricts the physical location of gas wells would be exceeding its
authority. As a result, the court would strike down the local
government’s restriction. Second, courts can invoke constitutional
authority for local governments to enhance public welfare protections
adopted by state law.253 If the courts were to find that local
governments could impose greater restrictions than those imposed
under state law when a regulation affects the public welfare, then the
reviewing court would uphold the local restriction.
A. Preemption of Fracking Under the Oil, Gas, and Solution
Mining Law
A state statute that expressly prohibits254 or preempts255 the local
law precludes the local government’s exercise of supersession
authority. The overriding authority of the State to preempt local
legislation embodies “the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to
act, as it always had, with respect to matters of State concern.”256
Thus, before arriving at a question as to the scope of the local
government’s supersession authority, courts will necessarily conduct a
preemption analysis.257 Preemption analysis entails two steps. First,
courts will look for direct conflict between the state and local laws, or
express preemption.258 Absent express preemption, courts will look
for implied preemption.259
If courts find implicit preemption analysis does not apply because
the express language of OGS makes this an issue of direct conflict,
then the scope of local authority will be determined by the plain
meaning of the supersession clause.260 Case precedent has shown the
comprehensiveness of the statute’s regulatory scheme, and the
253. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713–14 (N.Y. 1929).
254. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 2012); see Walker
v. Town of Hempstead, 643 N.E.2d 77, 78–79 (N.Y. 1994).
255. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346, 349 (N.Y. 1989); Albany Area
Builders Ass’n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1989).
256. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1977).
257. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226,
1234 (N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he preemption question was one of statutory construction, not
a search for implied preemption, because the Legislature included within the MLRL
an express supersession clause.”).
258. See, e.g., id., Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920
(N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186 (N.Y.
2001).
259. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
260. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234; Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
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legislative history is important,261 but not dispositive.262 The clause in
OGS that outlines the scope of state jurisdiction reads, “[t]he
provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas, and solution mining
industries.”263 In Frew Run, based on the language, “this title shall
supersede all other state and local laws relating to the extractive
mining industry,” the court held that the MLRL does not implicitly
preempt local zoning power.264 Therefore, if courts apply preemption
analysis, they will apply direct conflict analysis.
In Envirogas, the court found express preemption of all local laws
relating to the subject matter of oil, gas, and mining solution
activity.265 The court “acknowledge[d] that the qualifying language—
’relating to the regulation’—may be relevant to determining the scope
of the supersession.”266 Further, the court emphasized that any
interpretation of the scope of state authority must be limited by the
constitutional requirement that local powers be liberally construed.267
Under New York’s preemption analysis, the express preemption
language in ECL section 23-0303(2) should not be expanded based on
a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme, because the
analysis does not reach implied preemption analysis unless there is no
express preemption.268 Where there is express preemption language,
the scope of preemption is to be determined by the language alone.269
Therefore, “ECL § 23-0303(2) may be viewed as superseding only
those local laws ‘relating to the regulation’ of the oil and gas
industry.”270
The plain meaning of the OGS supersession clause is slightly
different from the MLRL, and this difference could be interpreted in
two ways. First, the Frew Run and Gernatt Asphalt decisions held
“relating to mining activity” not to include general land use
regulation, so long as the regulation set a higher standard than that

261. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
262. See supra notes 107–23.
263. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012).
264. Id. § 23-0703(2); see also Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 921.
265. See Matter of Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone. 447 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
266. Kenneally & Mathes, supra note 98, at 3.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id. at 3–4.
270. Id. at 4.
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required by state law.271 Both cases held legislative intent as
evidenced by the MLRL did not include prohibiting general land use
regulations, since zoning has only an “incidental effect” on mining
regulation.272 Under direct conflict analysis, courts may interpret
OGS to carve out room for local zoning ordinances that satisfy
minimum DEC safety standards.
As opposed to MLRL, OGS expressly preserves local authority
over local roads and property taxes. A law that expressly describes a
particular act to which it shall not apply creates an inference that
what is omitted was intended to be omitted.273 The OGS supersession
clause “shall not supersede local government jurisdiction over local
roads or the rights of local governments under the real property tax
law.”274 The clause represents “clear and explicit authority” against
any form of preemption or unreasonable limitation on the
municipality’s authority to adopt laws relating to local roads and
property taxes.275 Local roads and property taxes are among the
enumerated powers granted to local governments under the Statute
of Local Governments and the Municipal Home Rule Law.276 Had
the Legislature intended to carve out a municipality’s ability to use its
zoning powers to dictate whether and where drilling may occur, it
could have done so, similar to the carve-out for local roads and
property taxes. The fact that they did not do so may suggest that
courts will interpret the supersession clause to preclude the
municipality from now claiming such authority.277

271. See generally, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664
N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518
N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d
186 (N.Y. 2001).
272. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt, 664 N.E.2d at 1234; Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922.
273. See supra notes 153–55.
274. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2012).
275. See In re Envirogas, Inc. v. Town of Kiantone, 447 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1982) (citing Robin v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, 285 N.E.2d 285, 287–88 (N.Y.
1972)), aff’d, 454 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). An example of a reasonable
limitation is requiring that a local law adopted on the premise of regulating local
roads be reasonably related to such regulation. Id. Imposing local compliance fees on
well pads due to the pressure put on local roads by oil and gas industry trucks is
unreasonable. Id.
276. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. STAT. LOC. GOV’TS
§ 10 (McKinney 2012).
277. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 240 (McKinney 2012); Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of
N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 2002) (“[W]here the
Legislature lists exceptions in a statute, items not specifically referenced are deemed
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There is evidence in OGS as a whole and the legislative history that
the legislative intent was to preempt all local regulation. For direct
conflict analysis, the statute’s comprehensiveness and history are
indicative of the local role, if any, in regulation.278 OGS requires a
certain distance of separation between a well pad and bodies of
water.279 Thereby, OGS, and thus the DEC, regulate permissible and
impermissible land uses in the field and oil and gas activity. Similarly,
zoning ordinances establish permissible and impermissible land
uses.280 OGS and zoning ordinances regulate permissible land uses.
However, the fact that OGS touches upon permissible land uses is
not dispositive as to local zoning authority. DJL Restaurant held that
the purpose of the Alcohol Beverage Control Law was to “promote
temperance in the consumption of alcoholic beverages” and not to
regulate land use, notwithstanding limits imposed by the law on the
location of bars and adult entertainment liquor establishments.281
With regard to the removal of local zoning authority, Daytop Village
held the statute must provide clear intent to divest such authority.282
Under the rules of statutory construction,283 there may be intent to
relinquish local zoning authority, but the purpose of OGS is not to
regulate land use. The policy aims are to develop New York’s natural
resources, prevent waste, and protect landowners’ rights.284 As
MLRL contained similar policy statements seeking to develop natural
resources and the courts still upheld local zoning ordinances, courts
will also likely distinguish between OGS’s purpose and the purpose of
general land use regulations.285
to have been intentionally excluded.”); Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y.,
Inc. v. Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640 N.E.2d 125, 128 (N.Y. 1994).
278. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226
(N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y.
1987).
279. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0501 (McKinney 2012)
280. See, e.g., Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922; Young v. City of Binghamton, 447
N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d
397, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
281. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186, 191 (N.Y. 2001).
282. Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill., Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 931 (N.Y. 1991).
283. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 780 N.E.2d
174, 178–79 (N.Y. 2002); Jewish Home & Infirmary of Rochester, N.Y., Inc. v.
Comm’r of N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, 640 N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y. 1994) (expressio
unius est exclusio alterius).
284. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012).
285. See, e.g., DJL Rest., 749 N.E.2d 191; Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of
Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226, 1234–35 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v.
Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1987).
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If a reviewing court were to find the interpretation of MLRL
analogous to the OGS, then the court would uphold local zoning
authority. As a result, any community would have the power to bar
fracking within its jurisdiction and thereby limit New York’s tax
revenue opportunities from profits made on energy exploration and
development. Depending on the number of communities that choose
to prohibit local fracking, the New York government may lose control
over energy policy and lose the ability to adopt a comprehensive plan
for statewide energy production and use. Such an interpretation,
however, would also create more leverage for local communities that
desire access to scientific studies of the impact of fracking on public
welfare.
B.

Constitutional Analysis

Article IX of the New York State Constitution stipulates that any
infringement on the part of the state government on local authority
over “property, affairs or government” will not have the force of law
unless enacted under the re-enactment procedure.286 Ambiguity
surrounding the phrase “property, affairs or government” of local
government, as opposed to the property and affairs of state
government, led to the adoption of Chief Justice Cardozo’s
“substantial state concern” test.287 Cardozo found state concern
particularly prevalent in situations involving public safety and welfare
where the local government chose not to regulate.288 Later court
decisions in the context of a more integrated State became less
reticent to find matters of “substantial state concern.”289 However,
Cardozo also raised several situations wherein it is not likely a court
would find “substantial state concern” and thus would hold the
matter to be exclusively within the city or town’s discretion: namely,
where such a change would drastically affect local population or
degrade the infrastructure of the locality.290 Moreover, even where
the State has chosen to regulate, “[t]he [zoning] power is left intact,

286. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i).
287. See Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713–14 (N.Y. 1929); see also City of New
York v. Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of City of N.Y., 676 N.E.2d 847, 851–52 (N.Y.
1996); Hyman, supra note 209.
288. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712.
289. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 582–83 (N.Y. 1977);
Floyd v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 300 N.E.2d 704, 705–06 (N.Y. 1973).
290. See Adler, 167 N.E. at 712.
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except for the declaration of a minimum below which restriction may
not fall.”291
Here, OGS has set a standard for all gas development activity
within the state. The Legislature has proclaimed that developing
New York’s natural resources while preserving the environment is a
state concern.292 The distinction between a matter of local concern
and one of state concern lies in the scope of its impact. Noting the
policy goal of OGS and the technical expertise of the state agency
endowed with regulatory authority, removing the regulations put in
place to preserve the environment will conflict with a matter of state
concern: the preservation of the environment across town, county,
and city borders. Environmental standards are particularly necessary
where the regulated activity could potentially pollute a region much
larger than a city, as in the case of fracking.293
Intermingled with matters of state concern are matters of local
concern. Though the premise for local concern and local governance
is Article IX of the New York Constitution, disputes over state and
local regulatory territory are regularly decided by a balancing of
statutory interests per the Municipal Home Rule Law and the state
statute at issue.294 By invoking statutory law, courts avoid invalidating
a statute that conflicts with a constitutional mandate. As a result, the
concept of local concern has developed not only through the
constitution, but also through statutes. Notably, the power to adopt
local zoning ordinances in step with a local development plan that
protects local public welfare is among the matters of local concern.295
Preservation of the local public welfare, associated with greater
regulation, is a matter of local concern and therefore a municipality
would be within its constitutional power to enhance state-imposed
regulations. Therefore, in the case of OGS, the municipality would
maintain the authority to adopt zoning ordinances, as the state did
not adhere to the constitution’s re-enactment procedure.

291. Id. at 711–12.
292. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012).
293. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., People v. N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d 1222, 1223 (N.Y. 1982)
(requiring a broad reading of the Municipal Home Rule Law); Monroe-Livingston
Sanitary Landfill v. Town of Caledonia, 417 N.E.2d 78, 80 (N.Y. 1980).
295. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(i); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 2012); see
also N.Y. Trap Rock Corp., 442 N.E.2d at 1223–24; Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
341 N.E.2d 236, 242–43 (N.Y. 1975); Udell v. Hass, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901–02 (N.Y.
1968).
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If municipalities are not granted the authority to restrict the
physical location of gas wells and courts interpret the OGS to
preempt local regulation, then local communities will have limited
leverage to negotiate with gas drilling companies. Instead, the DEC
will decide the physical location of gas wells. Landowners may
choose not to sell, but neighboring landowners could sell their land or
mineral rights to their land. As stated above, there is a risk of public
drinking water contamination in communities where natural gas wells
are fracked.296
On the other hand, if municipalities are granted such authority,
then municipalities that are even generally in favor of drilling are left
either wholeheartedly accepting gas drilling and the state regulations
that come with it, or banning local gas drilling. A ruling that gives
municipalities the power to voice their concerns only through
prohibiting the activity, however, does not create a zero-sum game.
Instead, simply giving local government a seat at the table in
constructing safe regulations, and raising key local issues may
adequately address the interest in giving the municipality a strong
voice in whether gas development and its economic benefits develops
in New York. Though local authorities are presently hardly equipped
to deal with enforcing regulations, the DEC is heavily understaffed to
the point that any state regulations could not be effectively
enforced.297 In such an economic crunch, local governments may
provide some insight and boots on the ground to help enforce the
DEC’s regulations.
III. INCREASING PUBLIC WELFARE ONE ZONING ORDINANCE
AT A T IME
A. Preemption Analysis Should Not Apply
So far, three court decisions reviewing local ordinances limiting or
banning fracking have applied preemption analysis.298 Besides noting
that local governance is expressly preserved in the constitution, none
of the decisions have applied the express language in the constitution

296. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Allison Sickle, New York DEC Staff Shorthanded to Reply to 14,000
Marcellus Shale Comments—Environmental Inspectors Down to 16, D.C. BUREAU
(Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.dcbureau.org/20100429137/natural-resources-newsservice/new-york-dec-staff-shorthanded-to-reply-to-13500-marcellus-shalecomments-environmental-inspectors-down-to-16.html.
298. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
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for reconciling state laws that infringe on local governance.299
Although case law has narrowed the meaning of Article IX’s reenactment provision,300 the courts have not completely discarded
Article IX. To apply the law as written, the courts must invoke
Article IX where a conflict arises between a local ordinance and a
state statute.301
Even so, the two most recent cases have made clear that the OGS
is significantly analogous to the MLRL such that a reviewing court
will most likely uphold a local ordinance banning fracking under
preemption analysis.302 Although this Note argues for a reviewing
court to uphold local ordinances that prohibit fracking on
constitutional grounds, it is likely that courts will continue along this
line of decisions so long as it is unnecessary to invoke the constitution
to uphold local authority over local governance.
B.

Applying the Constitution

Article IX of the New York State Constitution requires a realm of
local authority to exist. The manner in which a local government
chooses to use its land is recognized in Article IX and in subsequent
cases as integral to local governance. To remain faithful to the
constitution and its policy of preserving local governance, courts
ruling on the validity of local zoning ordinances banning local
fracking should uphold the zoning ordinances.
Article 23 of the ECL authorizes and governs oil and gas
development in New York. In doing so, it sets forth the purpose and
policy objectives of the State; namely, preventing waste, promoting
recovery of the resource, and protecting the correlative rights of the
landowner.303 Consistent with this statutory directive, Article 23
provides a detailed statutory framework with exacting requirements
concerning the location and size of drilling units and the location of
well pads.304 These requirements reflect the need to site wells based
upon geology and environmental considerations. Once an express
intent to carve out an area for local regulatory action is found,
however, the court will not find OGS’s detailed statutory framework
informative.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301 (McKinney 2012).

See id. § 23-0501.
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The uniform application of statewide regulations ensures that the
OGS’s resource development and efficient recovery policy objectives
will be achieved.305 A contrary interpretation would inhibit this
objective by prohibiting what the State allows and promotes; namely,
oil and gas development. As such, any suggestion that municipalities
can regulate the location of oil and gas wells or exclude oil and gas
extraction, exploration, or development in any portion of a
municipality based upon zoning principles frustrates the policy aims
of the OGS’s statutory scheme.
The policy reasons favoring comprehensive centralized regulation
generally have not outweighed the local government’s interest in the
public welfare. Citing precedent established in cases interpreting the
MLRL’s supersession clause, the court should find OGS created a
similar carve-out for local land use regulations that do not impinge on
the State’s express authority to regulate gas development activities.
The Court in Gernatt Asphalt and Frew Run held that where the
State expressly claims authority to regulate all that “relates” to a
subject matter, the State has not preempted local regulation of land
use generally.306 The similarity between the OGS and the MLRL
supersession clauses favors upholding local zoning power.
Applying the Municipal Home Rule Law and supersession
authority essentially allows the courts to avoid imposing a
complicated and unusual procedure on the State Legislature. Like
the constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law provides for local
government authority over “local property, affairs, or government.”
It makes no mention, however, of the re-enactment procedure.
Therefore, courts have been less hesitant to invoke supersession
authority, since it will not place too high a hurdle on state regulation
of local matters of general concern. Furthermore, since the Municipal
Home Rule Law is only a statute, and not a constitutional provision,
the courts have more discretion to choose how to find a balance
between state and local power based on the tools of statutory
construction the court decides to apply when reading the statute. The
constitution would always trump a state statute where it applies.
By applying Article IX of the constitution, however, the court will
establish a clear distinction between local and state power, and

305. See id. § 23-0303(2).
306. See, e.g., Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Town of Sardinia, 664 N.E.2d 1226,
1234 (N.Y. 1996); Frew Run Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Town of Carroll, 518 N.E.2d 920,
922-23 (N.Y. 1987); see also DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 749 N.E.2d 186,
191 (N.Y. 2001).
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promote state-local cooperation in formulating regulations that may
severely impact the development of a local community. In the case of
fracking, multiple incidents have already occurred in New York and
neighboring states involving threats to water safety as a result of
drilling and disposing of wastewater.307 In Adler, Cardozo finds
disturbing a situation where the State government may decide to
“throw open Murray Hill to industry and trade” without seeking the
approval of the New York City government.308 Permitting fracking
based on State government approval alone would similarly throw
open town and city centers to fracking.
Cardozo’s exception for local zoning standards that are higher than
the standards set forth by the State government entity—in this case
the DEC—solves just as many problems as it creates. Having
unpredictably wavered between treating Article IX § 2 as a repository
for state power and a provision with some, though limited, meaning,
establishing Cardozo’s exception as a bright line rule clearly has the
benefits of predictability and potentially adheres more to the
intended meaning of the provision. On the other hand, by only
permitting the municipality to increase the standards set by the State
entity, the court would not just be interpreting the law, it would be
making a policy choice, or alternatively, limiting the policy choices
available to the municipality.
With regards to OGS, the Legislature directed the DEC to
consider both the importance of energy development for the State
and environmental concerns.309 Presumably, the former consideration
tends in favor of fewer restrictions on the land available to use for gas
drilling and the latter consideration tends in favor of more
restrictions. Clearly, if local government power consists only of the
ability to enact restrictions then the municipality would weigh in favor
of environmental considerations, but would be precluded from
expressing its preference for energy development considerations.
Though this result may appear unfair, it does properly reflect the
state-local dynamic. If a municipality were to lower the restrictions
imposed on gas development activity, then it may increase the
likelihood of drinking water contamination or air pollution, among
other concerns. As evidenced by the spread of fracking wastewater in
the Niagara River near Buffalo, and the rise in methane levels in

307. See supra notes 1, 3–5 and accompanying text.
308. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 712 (N.Y. 1929).
309. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303 (McKinney 2012).
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water-wells near fracking activities, less regulation can harm
Therefore, Cardozo’s exception tends
neighboring localities.310
toward preventing municipalities from harming neighboring
communities, while also preserving some form of local authority over
local regulation. In effect, a municipality’s choice may only cause
slight harm in the form of decreased state tax revenue to neighboring
municipalities.
Additionally, courts may find legislative intent in the Municipal
Home Rule Law for local governments to have power to increase
restrictions. When applying the Municipal Home Rule Law, courts
also found that permitting the local government to increase
restrictions was inherently inconsistent with state intent, yet still held
this to be a permissible manner in which to read the statute and
balance state and local power.311 Therefore, courts, in the same
manner as Cardozo in Adler, have not taken issue with bias in favor
of more restriction. The consequences of not accepting such a bias
would be to eliminate the supersession authority of local governments
to act in limited arenas. Though courts have been extremely hesitant
to find for the local governments to be endowed with constitutional
authority, they have actively interpreted the Municipal Home Rule
Law to protect some form of local regulation.
Certainly, if the courts rule that the OGS supersession clause
upholds local zoning ordinances that do not infringe on the state’s
regulation of gas development activities or that municipalities retain
authority under the New York Constitution to set stricter zoning
standards than those set by the state, then the DEC will have to
rethink its regulations. Particularly, due to significant environmental
concerns voiced during the 2011 notice and comment period for the
DEC’s final regulations as to gas drilling,312 and the resultant
prohibition of fracking or gas drilling in a number of towns where
state regulations would otherwise permit fracking, the DEC, and
potentially the legislature, may have to listen to local concerns.
Negotiation may increase the costs of regulating gas development
as the DEC must confer with local interests prior to regulation, but
these costs will not necessarily outweigh the benefits of energy
security and higher employment. Especially in the case of fracking,
where neither federal nor state regulators have required the full
310. Hart, supra note 28.
311. See DJL Rest. Corp., 749 N.E.2d at 191; Inc. Vill. of Nyack v. Daytop Vill.,
Inc., 583 N.E.2d 928, 929–30 (N.Y. 1991).
312. See DeWitt, supra note 63.
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disclosure of the materials used in fracking fluid, a slight increase in
transaction costs due to negotiation between state and local
governments is acceptable.
However, relying solely on the division between regulations related
to gas development and those related to land use is a tight rope to
walk. To ensure Article IX of the constitution and the division
between state and local authority is preserved, courts should not
continue to narrow local zoning authority or only maintain it through
often unpredictable applications of preemption analysis. Instead,
echoing Cardozo’s Adler concurrence, courts should uphold local
zoning authority as among the local powers that may only be
impaired by adherence to the constitution’s re-enactment procedure.
Thereby, each piece of state legislation that infringes on a local
government’s “property, affairs or government” will only preempt the
local ordinance if the state law passed the New York State
Legislature twice and was signed by the Governor twice in successive
sessions.313
The local ordinance would be upheld under Article IX. The New
York State Legislature passed the OGS once in 1971.314 Under
Article IX, the OGS would therefore not preempt a local ordinance
prohibiting the use of fracking because the OGS was only passed
once. Further, invoking Cardozo, “the subject . . . [is] in a substantial
degree a matter of State concern,”315 for which the local ordinance
will have established a higher standard of public safety.316 Therefore,
without adhering to the re-enactment procedure outlined in Article
IX, the OGS should not preempt a local ordinance prohibiting local
fracking.
CONCLUSION
Courts examining this issue should uphold local zoning ordinances
banning fracking within their towns’ jurisdictions. The three lower
court decisions that have reviewed the application of OGS have
applied state preemption analysis.317 In two of these cases, the court
upheld the zoning ordinance banning fracking within the respective
town’s jurisdiction.318 If a reviewing court were to find that OGS
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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intended to regulate the entire field of natural gas drilling, the court
should still uphold the zoning ordinance under the New York
Constitution. New York’s Constitution clearly requires re-enactment
of any state law contravening local governance, and land use and
zoning is a recognized area of local governance.319 Echoing Justice
Cardozo’s opinion, local governments did not surrender their
authority over local governance in the constitution and they should
not be required to surrender this authority where they act on behalf
of public safety or public welfare.320

319. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.

